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Abstract
Previous empirical works on municipal e¢ ciency have mostly used cross-sectional data
which makes it impossible to separate unobserved heterogeneity from ine¢ ciency. Furthermore,
they have also typically used a two stages approach which has been widely criticized as the
assumptions made in the rst stage are violated in the second stage, generating biased results.
We present one of the rst longitudinal parametric studies that analyze municipal e¢ ciency
and its determinants using a one step procedure. Furthermore, we are the rst of this kind that
analize overall e¢ ciency as well as e¢ ciency by clusters of municipalities in order to reduce
heterogeneity. We use administrative datasets of Chilean municipalities for the 2008-2010
period and our results suggest that Chilean municipalities have on average an ine¢ ciency level
of 30% with a signicant variance between clusters of municipalities. Also, our results suggest
that socio-economic, scal and political variables a¤ect municipal e¢ ciency. In particular, we
found that municipalities with tighter budget constraints are associated with more e¢ cient
municipalities.
JEL Classication: O54, H72
1 Introduction
Local governments (municipalities) are crucial in the pursue of a decentralized system of policy
making. This is because they are the closest political level to the population and their needs. Due
to this, municipalities have their own budgets and are mandated to provide, independently from
central government, a number of public services to their community.
We acknowledge Matthieu Berrones collaboration and the comments of Hermann von Gersdor¤, Lucas Palacios,
Juan Luis Correa and Marcelo Villena.
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Given their relevance, there have been a long series of studies which have tried to measure the
level of e¢ ciency of municipal provision of such public services. Traditionally, previous literature
have used a two stages approach, a rst stage to estimate ine¢ ciency and a second stage to estimate
the determinants that a¤ect the previously estimated ine¢ ciency. This two-stages approach has
been widely criticized (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) because the assumptions in the second stage
contradict those made in the rst stage, potentially biasing the results. In particular, in the rst
stage it is assumed that the ine¢ ciency term is independent and identically distributed while in the
second step ine¢ ciency is deterministic. Thus, a one stage approach has been suggested to solve
the drawbacks of the two stage approach.
Additionally, the vast majority of previous literature uses a cross-section approach. This formu-
lation presents the drawback that it is not possible to separately identify ine¢ ciency from municipal
unobserved heterogeneity. In order to overcome this di¢ culty, models with panel data have been
suggested. Recent literature has used panel data for municipal e¢ ciency estimation. Unfortu-
nately, most of the previous literature has used non-parametric methods which applies a two stage
approach to estimate ine¢ ciency and their determinants (Greene 2005c). Apart from this, they face
other drawbacks. Particularly, non-parametric methods uses linear programing techniques instead
of econometric methods which implies that the error is calculated and not estimated. This in turn
implies that non-parametric techniques have a deterministic nature. Thus, any deviation from the
frontier is interpreted as ine¢ ciency even though the source of these deviations may be due to
variables that are not under the control of the municipality. Furthermore, with availability of panel
data, non-parametric methods have an additional drawback. As non-parametric methods optimize
period by period, the e¢ ciency score is computed for each single year as in the cross-sectional
framework, therefore they ignore the panel dimension of the data.
There is a very scarce empirical literature that uses a one stage approach with parametric
models and panel data to estimate municipal e¢ ciency. We contribute to the literature by formally
outlining a methodological approach to this setting and by presenting one of the rst studies with
these characteristics. Furthermore, unlike previous related literature we analize overall e¢ ciency as
well as e¢ ciency by clusters of municipalities, in order to reduce heterogeneity, and thus diminishing
the risk of omitted variables.For e¢ ciency analysis, homogeneity of the municipalities under study
is very important, since as pointed out by previous literature (Afonso and Fernández 2008) a
highly heterogeneous group of municipalities may be the result of omitted variables and thus of a
misspecied model (e.g. due to scale e¤ects). Hence, we rst estimate our model for the whole
sample and then for each one of the identied clusters.
The specic application presented in this work is a stochastic frontier analysis for 309 Chilean
municipalities for the period 2008-2010. For this task we use administrative data provided by the
Chilean Government on the municipal provision of a series of public goods and services. Among
them the more important are: education, health, rubbish collection, contributions to social orga-
nizations, maintained green areas, and access to clean water. Results suggest that Chilean munic-
ipalities are heterogeneous in their ine¢ ciency levels and that on average ine¢ ciency reaches 30%
approximately. This is, Chilean municipalities could provide the same amount of services but with
a 30% less of resources. Regarding heterogeneity, we also analyze ine¢ ciency by more homoge-
neous subgroups of municipalities (clusters). We nd that results go in the same direction than
the general model although there are heterogeneous ndings when clusters were compared. Despite
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this, when we analyze the most e¢ cient municipalities per cluster, we found similar patterns in
the e¤ects of the determinants. We found that municipalities with the best results in each cluster
have a higher dependency on the municipal common fund (a fund aimed at redistributing municipal
income) relative to self-generated revenues, higher investment as a percentage of total expenditure,
a lower schooling level and a higher political concentration.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background of the method-
ology used for our estimation. Section 3 puts forward a literature review of previous empirical works.
Section 4 formally presents the proposed methodology. Section 6 provides details of the Chilean
case study, discussing the institutional framework of Chilean municipal management. Section 7
outlines the procedure for the construction of municipal clusters, the data and the summary statis-
tics. Section 8 and 9 present the results and the sensitivity analysis respectively. Finally, section 9
puts forward some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Product maximization versus Cost minimization
Theoretical references of frontier functions go back to Farrell (1957). He proposed that e¢ ciency of
a rm consists of two components: technical e¢ ciency and allocative e¢ ciency. The former reects
the ability of a rm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs, while the latter reects the
ability of a rm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices. These two
measures are then combined to provide a measure of total economic e¢ ciency. A simple example
of rms which use two inputs (x1 and x2) to produce output (y) under an assumption of constant
return to scale can be seen in Figure 1. The isoquant of the fully e¢ cient rm is represented by
YY in the Figure. Knowing this isoquant allows the measurement of technical e¢ ciency because,
if a given rm uses quantities of inputs, dened by the point P, to produce a unit of output,
the technical e¢ ciency of that rm is dened to be the ratio OR/OP, which is the proportional
reduction in all inputs that could theoretically be achieved without any reduction in output. Note
that the point R is technically e¢ cient because it lies on the technical isoquant.
If the price ratio, represented by the line CC in Figure 1, is also known, allocative e¢ ciency may
also be calculated. For a rm operating at P, allocative e¢ ciency is dened by the ratio OS/OR,
since the distance RS represents the reduction in production costs that would occur if production
were to occur at the allocatively (and technically) e¢ cient point R, instead of at the technically
e¢ cient, but allocatively ine¢ cient, point R. The total economic e¢ ciency is dened as the ratio
OR/OP, in which the distance RP can also be interpreted in terms of a cost reduction.
These e¢ ciency measures assume the production function of the fully e¢ cient rm is known,
which in practice is not the case, hence the e¢ cient isoquant must be estimated from the sample
data. Farrell suggests a parametric function, such as the Cobb-Douglas, such that no observed point
should lie to the left or below it. Since then, several authors have proposed di¤erent functional forms
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(e.g. translog, Zellner-Revankar generalized production function, etc.).1 The choice of functional
form bring a series of implications with respect to the shape of the implied isoquant and the
values of elasticities of factor demand and factor substitution, but as Greene (2005c) points out:
"the issue of functional form for the production function or cost function is generally tangential
to the analysis, and not given much attention". In empirical literature the most commonly used
production functions are the Cobb-Douglas and the Translog.
Greene (2005c) argues that cost ine¢ ciency is a blend of the two sources technical and allocative.
Despite this complexity, there are several studies which analyze cost ine¢ ciency because they allow
to include multiple inputs, which is not straightforward on the production side.
It should be noted that any deviation from cost e¢ ciency may come from two sources: input-
oriented technical ine¢ ciency and allocative ine¢ ciency (OR/OP and RS/OP in Figure 1 re-
spectively). In order to estimate the latter, additional data should be available, for example: the
vector of inputs prices. If the additional data is not available it is only possible to estimate the
input-oriented technical ine¢ ciency. As in the case study to be presented later, we do not know all
the inputs and their respective prices, we focus our attention in this study only on input-oriented
technical ine¢ ciency. Throughout this study we will refer to the input-oriented technical e¢ ciency
as cost e¢ ciency.
In general, the approach followed (i.e. maximize production or minimize costs) in the literature
depends on the exogeneity of output and inputs variables. In particular, when inputs are considered
more exogenous than the product (i.e. that they do not fully depend on municipal management)
product maximization is used and viceversa. In order to choose, the given institutional framework is
crucial, as for the case study to be later analyzed in which output is given by law (i.e. exogenous) and
inputs depend upon municipal management, a cost minimization approach will be more adequate
for our analysis.
2.2 Parametric versus Non-Parametric approaches
In order to measure e¢ ciency two types of approaches have been used: non-parametric (such as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH)) and parametric (such as Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA)). On the one hand, the non-parametric approach analyzes e¢ ciency from
the data available and not from imposed functional forms. Also, it uses linear programing techniques
instead of econometric methods which makes that the error is calculated and not estimated implying
that non-parametric techniques have a deterministic nature. Thus, any deviation from the frontier
is interpreted as ine¢ ciency even though the source of these deviations may be due to variables
that are not under the control of the municipality. Also, non-parametric methods use two stages
procedures, which have been criticized because of the contradictions between the assumptions made
in the rst stage versus to what is estimated in the second stage. Furthermore, with availability
of panel data, non-parametric methods have an additional drawback. As non-parametric methods
1The Zellner-Revankar form removes the return to scale restrictions, while the Translog form imposes no restric-
tions upon returns to scale or substitution posibilities but has the drawback of being susceptible to multicolinearity
and degrees of freedom problems.
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optimize period by period, e¢ ciency score is computed for each single year as just in a cross-sectional
framework, therefore they ignore the panel dimension of the data.
On the other hand, parametric methods, such as the stochastic frontier analysis, originally
developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van Broeck (1977), come from an
extension of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Maximum Likelihood (ML). In this way, while OLS
estimate the most appropriate function of medium cost, the stochastic frontier analysis estimates
the maximum production or the minimum cost. Furthermore, it decomposes the deviation from
the frontier in to a random component (the error term) and the ine¢ ciency. Hence, this approach
can accommodate exogenous shocks such as bad weather and separate it from ine¢ ciency. An
additional advantage of parametric methods is that, when there is panel data, they take into account
the unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities, which could play a crucial role in explaining
the performance of cities.2 The drawback of parametric methods is the necessity of an assumption
about the production (or cost) function. As, in this study, we use the parametric approach, we
tackle its weakness by assuming di¤erent production (cost) functions in order to check if results are
sensitive to them.
3 Previous Empirical Literature
The analysis of municipal e¢ ciency has been carried out mainly in two steps models: the rst one as
an e¢ ciency analysis itself and the second as an evaluation of its determinants (see Bellaguer-Coll
et al. (2002), Herrera and Francke (2009), Afonso and Fernandes (2006)).
Consequently, in the rst step the focus has been placed on the analysis of the productive process
by which the local government utilize the available resources to generate goods and services; As
such, municipal performance has been measured by the e¢ ciency of municipal expenditure. The
results obtained in previous literature, which focused in municipal e¢ ciency, suggests that there are
important ine¢ ciencies on municipal expenditure. For example, the Afonso and Fernandez (2006)
DEA study for Portugal concludes that on average municipalities of the Lisbon region could achieve
the same performance with 39% less resources. Similarly, a second DEA evaluation applied to 278
Portuguese municipalities showed similar ine¢ ciency levels (Afonso and Fernandez 2008). For Peru,
the parametric cross-section analysis of Herrera and Francke (2007) showed that municipalities could
achieve the same provision of good and services with 58% less resources. In the same line, Pang, Liu,
Peng and Wu (2010) nd ine¢ ciency levels of 41% for Taiwanese municipalities and Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007) with a DEA and a FDH nd similar results for Spain.
Studies focused on the second stage, in which the determinants of ine¢ ciency are estimated,
have shown, for instance for the case of Belgium, that the level of education has positive e¤ects
on municipal e¢ ciency while average income and the amount of transfers relative to local income
have negative e¤ects on municipal e¢ ciency, see De Borger and Kerstens (1996a). Also for Bel-
gium, Van den Eckaut et al. (1993) nd a positive relationship between municipal e¢ ciency and
political composition of the City Council (i.e. better results for municipalities with heterogeneous
2Parametric methods estimate the time prole of the scores endogenously in a single panel.
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composition of the council versus those with a more homogeneous composition). For the case of
Peru, Herrera and Francke (2009) nd that a higher participation in the municipal common fund (a
fund aimed at redistributing municipal income) has a negative e¤ect on municipal e¢ ciency while
political participation a¤ects positively municipal e¢ ciency. The parametric and non-parametric
evaluation of Greek municipalities by Anthanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) nds a negative rela-
tionship between e¢ ciency levels and the ratio of transfers over municipal total income, population
density and political a¢ liation (measured as parties a¢ liated to the central government). For Fin-
land, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) nd a positive relationship between municipal e¢ ciency and
certain age groups (mainly with individuals between 35-49 years old) and a negative relationship
with peripheric geographic location, high income levels, high population, transfers of good and ser-
vices from other municipalities and higher participation in municipal funds. For Taiwan, Pang, Liu,
Peng and Wu (2010) concluded that environmental policies adopted by municipalities were crucial
for municipal e¢ ciency.
In one of the very few parametric studies with panel data, Bianchini (2010) evaluates the ef-
ciency of 100 Italian chief towns of Province in providing urban environmental quality during
1998-2007. She nds that, besides socio-economic variables, those which explain di¤erent munic-
ipal performance are the scal and political ones. The other known parametric panel data study
has been carried out for the Czech Republic by Stastna and Gregor (2011). They nd that popula-
tion size, distance to the regional center, share of university educated citizens, capital expenditure,
subsidies per capita and the share of self-generated revenues increase ine¢ ciency.
Previous results from the literature, as those mentioned above (see a more complete list in Table
1) are based on a variety of estimation methods. On the one hand, parametric methods have been
used which assume a functional form to model the relationship between the variables of input and
output and on the other hand non-parametric methods have been used, which assume that any
deviation from the frontier are due to ine¢ ciency. Under this general setup, the stochastic frontier
analysis is the main parametric approach while the data envelopment analysis and the free disposal
hull are the main approaches in non-parametric methods. Due to the variety of techniques for the
estimation of municipal e¢ ciency, there have been some studies which focuses on the analysis of the
di¤erences of the results given by the di¤erent techniques. As such, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a
and 1996b) in Belgium and Worthington (2000a and 2000b) in Australia explore the di¤erences
of the results given for the same municipalities using parametric and non-parametric methods.
Similarly, Van den Eckaut et al. (1993) focused in the comparison of the results of DEA and FDH.
All these studies have shown that ndings obtained about municipal e¢ ciency are sensitive to the
technique applied. However, despite the magnitude of e¢ ciency changes from method to method,
the general results are very similar.
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to mention that most of the parametric evidence uses cross sec-
tional data, being the exception the working papers of Bianchini (2010) and Stastna and Gregor
(2011). This is crucial as this kind of data may be informative for e¢ ciency measures, but it
presents the drawback that it is not possible to disentangle municipal e¢ ciency from municipal
heterogeneity (see Greene 2005a, 2005b and 2005c). In addition, it should be noted that the works
of Bianchini (2010) and Stastna and Gregor (2011) carried out an overall analysis. Some authors
(Afonso and Fernandez 2008) have criticized this kind of approach as municipalities are very het-
erogeneous, which may be due to omitted variables, generating in this way a misspecied model.
To reduce this risk the authors proposed to use more homogeneous clusters of municipalities.
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For parametric models, the majority of the empirical evidence on technical e¢ ciency mentioned
above uses a two step approach, where the second step estimates the determinants of the ine¢ ciency
estimated in the rst step. This is carried out regressing the estimated ine¢ ciency on exogenous
variables which may a¤ect municipal performance. This two step method has been widely criticized
in the literature, since it assumes that the exogenous variables included in the second step are not
correlated with the variables used to estimate the ine¢ ciency in the rst step. The reason for this is
that in the rst step it is assumed that ine¢ ciency is independent and identically distributed, but in
the second step the assumption is that ine¢ ciency is explained by exogenous variables, which may
be a contradiction. In other words, if the variables included in the second step are not orthogonal
to those included in the rst step, this method will obtain biased results (Wang and Schmidt 2002).
Consequently, to increase the number of input, output or exogenous variables will probably increase
the probability of violating the assumption. This issue is particularly problematic for two stage
studies that employ non-parametric methods (Simar and Wilson 2007).3
To solve this problem in the parametric case Khumbhakar, Gosh and McGuckin (1991) proposed
a one step estimation method, in which determinants of ine¢ ciency are estimated jointly with the
frontier given the appropriate assumptions about the error terms. This method of estimation solves
the inconsistency on the estimators due to the assumptions imposed on the ine¢ ciency term. Exists
two options for this one step estimation. The rst one incorporates the exogenous determinants
of the ine¢ ciency directly into the production function (Battese and Coelli, 1992) and the second
one and more used in the literature, includes the exogenous determinants into the mean of the
ine¢ ciency term (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Interpretation of results di¤er in each option. In
the former, the e¤ect of the determinants of the ine¢ ciency term determines the position of the
production function, whereas in the latter they are interpreted as the distance to the frontier.
In this context, this work contribute to the empirical literature by presenting one of the rst
longitudinal parametric studies that analyze municipal e¢ ciency and its determinants using a one
step procedure. Specically, we include the exogenous determinants into the mean of the ine¢ ciency
term in one step procedure in order to avoid the problems described above. Furthermore, we are
the rst of this kind that analize overall e¢ ciency as well as e¢ ciency by clusters of municipalities
in order to reduce heterogeneity, and thus diminishing the risk of omitted variables.
4 Methodology
4.1 Deterministic Frontier Analysis
As mentioned above there are two approaches used for the estimation of frontier functions, the
parametric and the non-parametric methods. The former approach can be divided in to its de-
terministic versus its stochastic branch. Regarding the deterministic branch, a lengthy literature
3 In their own words:"A more serious problem in all of the two-stage studies that we have found arises from
the fact that DEA e¢ ciency estimates are serially correlated. Consequently, standard approaches to inference are
invalid". Furthermore, the two stage approach is routine in the DEA literature (Greene 2005c).
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commencing with theoretical work by Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) and the pioneering empir-
ical study by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) has been directed at models of production that
specically account for the proposition that a production function is a theoretical ideal. If y = f(x)
denes a production relationship between inputs, x, and an output, y, then for any given x, the
observed value of y must be less than or equal to f(x). The implication for an empirical regression
model is that in a formulation such as y = h(x; )+u, u must be negative. Because the theoretical
production function is an ideal the frontier of e¢ cient production any nonzero disturbance must
be interpreted as the result of ine¢ ciency. By duality the former approach presented for product
maximization, can be applied for cost minimization.
Due to the limitation of the deterministic frontier approach Aigner, et al. (1977) proposed in-
stead a formulation within which observed deviations from the production function could arise from
two sources: (1) productive ine¢ ciency, that would necessarily be negative, and (2) idiosyncratic
e¤ects that are specic to the rm and that could enter the model with either sign. The end result
was what they labeled as stochastic frontier.
4.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis was developed by Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van
Broeck (1977) as a model to estimate production and/or cost frontiers. Their input-oriented spec-
ication, denes the minimum cost level for observation i needed to produce a good and services
vector given input prices (wi). Thus, the model can be expressed as:
Ci = C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi + ui) (1)
i = 1; :::::; N with ui  0
where:
Ci is the observed (actual) cost or expenditure of municipality i
C(yi; wi; ) is the cost frontier of municipality i
yi is the output vector of municipality i
 is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
vi is an iid random variable:This variable represents exogenous factors which are not controlled
by the municipality which a¤ect the cost level (e.g. weather, luck , regulation, etc). ui is a random
variable which correspond to the ine¢ ciency level in costs and its distribution will depend on the
assumptions made (explained below).
The parameters of this model are estimated by Maximum Likelihood, given suitable distri-
butional assumptions for the error term. Aigner, et al. (1977) assumed that vi has a normal
distribution and ui has either the half-normal or the exponential distribution. The main criticism
is that there is no a priory justication for the selection of any particular distributional form for
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the ui . Since then, started a literature which have proposed more general distributional forms,
such as the truncated-normal (Stevenson 1980) and the two-parameter Gamma (Greene 1990).4
It is crucial to notice that deviations between the observed cost (Ci) and the frontier (C(yi; wi; ))
can come from two sources: technical ine¢ ciency of the municipality (ui) or random shocks which
are not under the control of the municipality (vi). Both components are assumed to be independent
from each other. The stochastic frontier method consists of the estimation of the variation of (vi)
and (ui) in order to obtain evidence of the relative e¤ect of each of them on costs. Thus, the cost
e¢ ciency level of a municipality (CE ) will be given by the ratio between actual costs and the cost
frontier in order to reach certain output yi, given input prices wi. Formally, this is given by:
CEi =
C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi)
C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi + ui)
= exp( ui) (2)
when the value of equation (2) tends to 1, implies that municipality i is very e¢ cient in terms
of costs because actual costs will be similar to the cost e¢ cient level. On the other hand, CE<1
provides a measure of the gap between the minimum possible cost and the observed one. The
ine¢ ciency term itself (ui) is not observable, therefore "i = vi+ ui must be used for the estimation
of equation (2). In order to do this, the estimation is carried out computing the expected value of
the ine¢ ciency term component (ui) given the composite error term ("i). Hence, we obtain:
CEi = E [exp ( uij"i)] = E [exp ( uij(vi + ui))] (3)
In order to nd E [ uij"i] the conditional density function must be known, and this function is
given by:
f (uij"i) = f(ui; "i)
f("i)
=
f(ui; (vi + ui))
f("i)
(4)
To estimate this, it is necessary to assume a probability distribution for both error components.
As it was previously mentioned, in all the models vi is considered as independent and identically
distributed following a normal distribution (N
 
0; 2v

). Despite there are no consensus on which
distribution to assume for ui, the most used one in the empirical literature is the truncated-normal
(N +
 
; 2u

). The main reason for this is that this distribution allows us to estimate the determi-
nants of ine¢ ciency in one step, avoiding the problems presented above when a two stage approach
is carried out.
After both distributions are dened, their distributions functions should be obtained:
4Truncated normal and the two-parameter Gamma were introduced because the Half-normal and exponential
distributions both have a mode at zero. This causes conditional technical ine¢ ciency scores, specially in the neigh-
bourhood of zero that can involve articially high technical e¢ ciency levels. The Truncated Normal is more exible
since the modal e¢ ciency value can also be away from one, and for this reason in most empirical works it is preferred
relative to the Half Normal.
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f (vi) =
1
v
p
2
exp
 v2
22v

(5)
f (ui) =
2
u
p
2
exp
 u2
22u

(6)
as the joint density function (f(ui; "i)) is unknown, the joint density function of both error term
components can be estimated as (f(ui; vi)) and replaced it in the term vi = "i ui. As ui and vi are
independent to each other, the joint density function corresponds to the product of the individual
density functions such as:
f(ui:vi) = f(ui) f(vi) =
2
2vu
exp
 u2
22u
  v
2
22v

(7)
by replacing v = "  u in equation (7)we obtain the joint density function of ui and "i:
f(ui:"i) =
2
2vu
exp
 u2
22u
  ("  u)
2
22v

(8)
Now, to nd the denominator of equation (4), we integrate equation (8) to get:
f("i) =
1Z
0
f(ui:"i)du =
2p
2

1  

 "


exp
 "2
22

(9)
where 2 = 2u + 
2
v and  =
u
v
and () is the cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal. Using this parametrization,  is the ratio of the variability coming from each of the variables
that conform the composite error term. Therefore, if 2u ! 0 (and thus  ! 0), it is the random
e¤ect the one that predominates relative to the ine¢ ciency and thus the density function of the
composite error term tends to a normal. By contrast, if 2u ! 1 (and thus  ! 1) the gap
between the minimum cost and the actual cost will be mainly determined by the ine¢ ciency term
component (ui).
Finally, replacing equation (9) into equation (4) we obtain the density function of u given ":
f (uij"i) = f(ui; "i)
f("i)
=
1p
2

1      exp
 (u  )2
22

(10)
where:
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 =
 "2u
2
(11)
2 =
2u
2
v
2
(12)
From the above formulation, we conclude that f (uij"i) is the density function of a variable
that distributes N +
 
; 2

:Once this distribution is known, and given that the value of cost
ine¢ ciency ui is not observable, it is possible to use the expected value E(uij"i) as the estimator
of the cost ine¢ ciency of each municipality.
E(uij"i) =  + 
24 
 i


1  
 i


35 (13)
where  () is the density function of a standard normal. Thus, the cost e¢ ciency function for a
municipality is:
CEi = E [exp ( uij"i)] =
1  

   i

1  

 i
 ex p i + 22

(14)
4.3 Determinants of Ine¢ ciency
In order to implement a one stage approach to stochastic frontier analysis, there are two options: the
rst one incorporates the determinants directly as regressors in the non-stochastic component of the
cost frontier. The second one, incorporates indirectly the determinants in the stochastic component,
in particular on the variable ui. Thus, in the rst approach, it is assumed that determinants a¤ect
directly the cost frontier by moving it. By contrast, the second approach assumes that determinants
a¤ects the costs ine¢ ciency levels. This latter approach was introduced in the literature by Battese
and Coelli (1995) and it allows to nd the determinants of the estimated ine¢ ciency. Therefore,
the interpretation of the results corresponds to the distance between the e¤ective costs and the cost
frontier.
There is no consensus in the literature on which of the previous alternatives is preferred (Greene
2005c). Due to this and given our objective of nding the determinants of the ine¢ ciency, we use
the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach.
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4.4 Estimation Method
When panel data is available, there are two main approaches for the estimation of frontier functions:
xed and random e¤ects. In order to choose the more appropriate method it is important to consider
the assumptions about the ine¢ ciency term and the linearity of the production function. If the
production function is not linear, then the within estimator will be inconsistent as the di¤erence
with respect to the mean may not eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity, furthermore, in short
panels (as in our case) xed e¤ects su¤er of what is known as the incidental parameter problem and
random e¤ects should be used. If the production function is linear, then in principle both methods
may be appropriate depending on the assumptions made on the ine¢ ciency term.
When the ine¢ ciency term is time invariant Fixed E¤ects and Random E¤ects present problems
as in both approaches ui carries both: ine¢ ciency and, in addition, any time invariant municipal
specic heterogeneity. Additionally, for both approaches, the time invariance assumption in long
time series of data, is likely to be a particularly strong assumption.
For these reasons, recent literature have promoted models with a time varying ine¢ ciency term.
Even in this context, xed e¤ects do not take into account time invariant covariates (which is
our ultimate interest in this study). We now formally analyze whether a random e¤ects model is
preferred to a xed e¤ects approach, or vicevera, for this particular setting.
 Fixed E¤ects approach
If the ine¢ ciency term is time invariant (ui) the Schmidt and Sickles xed e¤ects formulation
implies that:
yit =   ui + 0xit + vit (15)
yit = i + 
0xit + vit (16)
The model is reinterpreted by treating i as the rm specic ine¢ ciency term. There are three
important restrictions in this model. First, any time invariant unobserved heterogeneity will be
pushed into i and ultimately into
^
ui, where:
^
ui = maxi
^
i   ^i (17)
Second, with longer time periods the assumption that ine¢ ciency is time invariant is compli-
cated, as in general, individuals learn with experiences. Finally, since this approach precludes
covariates that do not vary through time, such variables cannot appear in this model. To overcome
these rst two shortcomings Greene (2003, 2005a, 2005b and 2005c) proposed the true Fixed E¤ect
model, given by:
yit = i + 
0xit + vit   uit (18)
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This model introduces new problems. As Greene (2003, 2005a, 2005b and 2005c) recognizes,
the rst one is that if this model is estimated by the brute force approach (LSDV ), it would be
impractical for cases in which there are many municipalities as perhaps thousands of parameters
must be estimated. A second and more di¢ cult issue is the incidental parameters problem. With
small T (group size in our applications, T is 3), many xed e¤ects estimators of model parameters
are inconsistent and are subject to a small sample bias. To date, there has been no systematic
analysis of the estimator for the stochastic frontier model.5 Greene (2005c) nds that the incidental
parameter problem a¤ects the variances and not the slopes and that the transmission of the biases
are not as large as expected.6
 Random E¤ects approach
For the case of random e¤ects, the model can be expressed as follows:
yit = + 
0xit + vit   ui (19)
The random e¤ects model has three noteworthy shortcomings. The rst two are common be-
tween Fixed and Random e¤ects models. The rst problem with the random e¤ects model is its
implicit assumption that ine¢ ciency is the same in every period, which for a long time series of data
is likely to be a particularly strong assumption. The second shortcoming of this model, regardless
of how it is formulated, is that in this model, ui carries both the ine¢ ciency and, in addition, any
time invariant municipal specic heterogeneity. The third shortcoming is its implicit assumption
that ine¢ ciency is not correlated with the included variables. Given these problems, several studies
suggest to modify this by proposing the true random e¤ect model with a time variant ine¢ ciency
term. Among these works are: Battese and Coelli (1995) and Kumbhakar and Orea (2003). The
former proposed the one presented in equation (3) while the latter proposed a more general form.
Thus, including the time variant ine¢ ciency term the true random e¤ects model becomes:
yit = + wi + 
0xit + vit   uit (20)
where wi is the random municipality specic e¤ect. We can formulate this model for a stochastic
frontier with a municipal specic random constant term as follows:
5As Greene (2005c) points out, the analysis has an additional layer of complication because unlike any other
familiar setting, it is not parameter estimation that is of central interest in tting stochastic frontiers. No results
have yet been obtained for how any systematic biases (if they exist) in the parameter estimates are transmitted to
the JLMS estimates of the ine¢ ciency scores.
6 If there is persistent ine¢ ciency, it would be completely absorbed in the municipal specic constant term which is
also capturing any time invariant heterogeneity. Ultimately, i+vit ui contains both municipal specic heterogeneity
and ine¢ ciency and both may have invariant and time varying elements. Thus, there is no perfect way to disentangle
them based on observed data (Greene 2003).
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yit = (+ wi) + 
0xit + vit   uit (21)
yit = i + 
0xit + vit   uit
The time invariant random constant term embodies the unobserved municipal heterogeneity.
This form of the model overcomes the rst two shortcomings of the random e¤ects models mentioned
above. The only remaining issue here is the assumption of no correlation between inputs and any
part of the error term (i + vit   uit). By construction vit is white noise. The correlation between
inputs and ine¢ ciency (uit) could be reduced through the inclusion of environmental e¤ects (z0s)
in the mean and/or variance of the distribution of the ine¢ ciency term (as equation (4)). Finally,
the assumption of no correlation between the individual e¤ect (i) and the covariates becomes
di¢ cult to defend, Mundlak´s (1978) approach can be used to capture the correlation between the
individual e¤ect (i) and the average of the regressors. Thus, we propose the following:
i = 0 + 
0
1xi + ji (22)
where ji is white noise (ji  N

0; 2j

). This is the more general formulation and the one
that allows us to overcome the mentioned shortcomings (except the assumption of no correlation
between the covariates and (vit   uit).
Consequently, we postulate that in this context a random e¤ects model, that follows the formu-
lation outlined above, is preferred to a xed e¤ects approach. Hence, the basic model we propose
for the estimation of fronteir functions can be expressed as follows:7
ln(C(yit; )) = 0 +
RX
r=1
rln(yrit) +
1
2
RX
r=1
KX
k=1
kln(yrit)ln(ykit) +
JX
j=1
jxjt + vit + uit (23)
where C(yit; ) is the cost function of municipality i in period t. yit is the output of municipality
i in period t;  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; We also include the variable
xt which are dummies that control for time. vit is a white noise which is assumed independent
and identically distributed (iid) N
 
0; 2v

and independent of uit. uit represents the non negative
ine¢ ciency term which may vary over time and is distributed as truncated-normal (N +
 
zit; 
2
u

).
This is:
uit = z
0
it +Wit (24)
7 It should be noted that we did not include in this formulation the input prices variable, wi, see (1). The reason
for this is the typical limited available information on input prices at the municipal level. In addition, much of the
associated prices correspond to salaries, which in the municipal sector are typically set by law, and therefore are
quite similar, the exception being rural areas in which a premium is usually paid. While, we do not have this specic
information for all the cases, as we are dealing with panel data and since these salaries do not change much through
time, not including these input prices should not a¤ect much the results of the study.
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where zit are the determinants of the ine¢ ciency of municipality i at time t,  is a vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated and Wit is a white noise distributed N+
 
0; 2u

:Finally, as
the cost measure is usually specied in natural logs, the ine¢ ciency term, uit, can be interpreted
as the percentage deviation of observed performance from the municipalitys own frontier (at least
for small deviations).
The model follows Battese and Coelli (1995) but applied to cost minimization. Their model
considers the joint maximization of equations (23) and (24) by maximum likelihood (ML). The es-
timated parameters should be replaced in equation (23) obtaining the estimated variables presented
in equations (11) and (12). Then these variables are used in equation (14) to estimate municipal
ine¢ ciency.
For the e¤ciency analysis, homogeneity of the municipalities under study is important. Previ-
ous literature (Afonso and Fernández 2008) have pointed out the importance of homogeneity as a
highly heterogeneous group of municipalities may be the result of omitted variables and thus of a
misspecied model (e.g. due to scale e¤ects). The authors suggest the use of clusters of municipal-
ities. Given this, we estimate the model explained above for the whole sample rst, and then for
each of the clusters dened with the methodology later specied (see appendix). In this way we
will consider more homogenous municipalities which will allow us to decrease the risk of omitted
variables.
5 The Case of Chilean Municipalities: Institutional Frame-
work
Chile is organized in 15 regions.8 Each one of them has provinces (54 in total) and each of the
provinces has municipalities (345 in total). The Organic Law of Municipalities (Law No18.695)
establishes how municipalities are constituted (i.e. the Major and the City Council), how their
authorities are elected and their attributions. The major has two main attributions: (i) those
related to municipal management and (ii) those attributed to the municipality as an institution.
Among the former, the major is the only legally responsible individual in judicial and extra-judicial
cases and also he/she is the responsible for the municipal budget. On the other hand, the city
council is in charge of scalization and enhancement of community participation.
5.1 Specic functions of the local government
The Law No18.695 establishes that the local government has 6 exclusive responsibilities and 13
shared with other institutions. Among the former are: the planication and management of the
development communal plan (PLADECO, in Spanish), promotion of comunitarian development,
public transport regulation, hygiene services, urbanism and construction norms. Among the shared
8Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Valparaíso, Región Metropolitana, del
Libertador Bernardo OHiggins, Maule, Bío-Bío, Araucanía, de Los Ríos, de Los Lagos, Aysén and Carlos Ibañez del
Campo and Magallanes and Chilean Antartica.
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responsibilities are those which attributes to municipalities the main responsibility for education
and health at the local government area.
Regarding nancial matters, article 13o of Law No18.695 establishes the main source of municipal
assets, among which are:
 All real state goods they acquire.
 Transfers from the regional government.
 Resources from the municipal common fund.
 Benets obtained from the services they deliver and for any concession (rights) or permits
they give.
 Income received as a result of their activities and activities in related dependencies.
 Income collected from all the taxes the law allows local government to levy. Among these are:
territorial tax, transport tax and commercial rights on alcoholic sells.
 Interests and penalties.
Municipal income can be classied depending on the source of funding. There are two main
funding sources: permanent self-generated revenues and the municipal common fund. Other sources
are transfers from the regional government and the central government. Among the latter, there are
transfers for education and health services. Thus, local government acts as an intermediary between
local education and health services and the respective ministry. Next, we give below some details
regarding the income sources of the municipal budget coming from non-conditional transfers of the
central government (education and health), i.e. permanent self-generated revenues and municipal
common fund.
5.1.1 Municipal Common Fund (FCM)
The Municipal common fund is a fund created by the local government reform in 1979. The objective
is to redistribute communal income in order to guarantee the achievement of municipal functions
and its adequate functioning. Hence, the sources of funding of the FCM come from municipal
income and are dened by article 14o of Law No18.695 in the way presented in Table 2.
Regarding the mechanism of distribution of this fund, there is a determined structure which
denes it. The mechanism of distribution is presented in Table 3. Thus, the rst 25% corresponds
to an amount transferred to be distributed in the same proportion in all the municipalities in the
country. The next 10% is distributed depending on poverty levels of each municipality (i.e. number
of poor people relative to poor people in the country). The next 30% is distributed according to
the number of assets exempt of territorial tax relative to the total of exempts assets (regarding
territorial tax only) in the country. Finally, the last 35% is transferred to those municipalities
which generate lower permanent self-generated revenue (IPP) per capita than the national average.
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5.1.2 Permanent self-generated revenues (IPP)
Permanent self-generated revenues (IPP) are the sources of fundings that local governments gen-
erate from municipal management. Income generated from these sources has no restriction for the
municipality in what and where to invest it. From article 38 of the municipal rents law No3,063,
IPP are composed by: municipal rights income, hygiene rights, concessions, municipal property
rents, percentage of the income from territorial tax and transport tax, among others. From these
sources most of the income of IPP comes from: territorial tax, commercial rights and transport
tax. The rst one is a tax imposed to agricultural and non-agricultural land.9 From this source of
income, only 40% remains in the municipality for its own funding and the other 60% is directed to
the municipal common fund (FCM).10
Commercial rights are regulated mainly by the municipality as it chooses the tax rate to charge
(subject to a range established by law). Of the amount of income collected by commercial rights,
only the richest four municipalities (Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura) transfer a
proportion to the FCM: Santiago 55% and the other three 65%. Finally, regarding transport tax,
from the amount collected the 37,5% goes for municipal benet and the rest (64,5%) go to the
FCM.
6 Municipal Clustering, Data and Summary Statistics
6.1 Municipal Clustering
Chilean municipalities are highly heterogeneous regarding their territory, nancial capacity and
human resources (Valenzuela 2008). These di¤erences impact directly on municipal organization, in
their capacity to self generate resources and in the way municipalities confront the administration of
services and public programs. Therefore, it is key to separate municipalities into clusters according
to specic variables, otherwise the comparison among municipalities will be less informative as, for
example, comparing Las Condes (the richest municipality in Chile) with Cobquecura (a poor rural
municipality).
In order to perform the clustering analysis, we use the municipal typology of the provision of mu-
nicipal services elaborated by the Chilean Under Secretary of Regional Development (SUBDERE ).11
This typology is elaborated based on clusters with the objective of grouping municipalities with a
minimum internal variance between them and maximal external variance with other groups (see
a detailed description of the methodology in the appendix). The conformed groups must be de-
termined by grouping variables di¤erent than those used in the econometric estimation. This is
9This is regulated in the Law No17,235 about territorial tax.
10For the four richest municipalities, Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura percentage are: 35% and
65% respectively.
11 It is a governmental Institution in charge of local governments, regions and provinces of Chile. SUBDERE
publishes a document with the typology named Tipología Comunal para la Provisión de Servicios Municipales,
División de Municipalidades, Departamento de Finanzas Municipales. SUBDERE, Ministerio del Interior.
17
because we want to obtain unbiased and consistent results. In the municipal typology elaborated by
SUBDERE, municipalities are clustered following two concepts: socio-territorial and socio economic
indexes, which are described in Table 4.
From these clusters, and using both indexes, a graphic analysis of the dispersion is presented in
Figure 2. This gure suggests which groups can be identied. Based on this analysis and following
the number of clusters put forwatd by SUBDERE we dene 6 clusters as presented in Table 5.
For our estimations presented below, we grouped clusters 1 and 2 into one cluster due to few
observations in cluster 1. Thus, we use 5 clusters for our analysis, see Table 6, in which our new
cluster 1 consolidates the former 1 and 2. To see their main characteristics see Table 7.
6.2 Data description and Summary Statistics
The data for this study comes from the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM ). This
system is a management tool which consolidate a group of variables and statistical data of Chilean
municipalities. SINIM is updated once a year and has information of all 345 municipalities in Chile
from 2001 to 2010. For this study we use data for the period 2008-2010. The reason for this is that
for some of the variables there are no data for previous years. The main sources of information for
SINIM are municipalities (40% of the information) and ministries or other public services (60%).
SINIM is the main source of information for municipal issues in Chile as it includes information on
management, nance, human resources and municipal characterization.
For our analysis we use output and input variables as well as determinants. We now explain
which variables were included in each one of them.
a) Output Variables:
The output variables here presented are the ones denoted by yit in equation (23). Due to the
inherent di¢ culties for quantifying the output provided by municipalities, proxies will be used (for
details see Bradford et al., 1969; Levitt and Joyce, 1987). These variables should consider the
multiple functions assigned to municipalities and capture the results obtained in all the areas in
which they deliver goods and services. After the revision of the empirical literature and given the
data available, we include 6 output variables described below and whose summary statistics are
described in Table 8.
1. Municipal Scale: we consider the scale (size) of the municipality as an output (for the general
model only, as this is an important variable for clustering) as bigger municipalities should provide
more public goods and services.
2. Education: one of the main services provided by municipalities is education. Municipalities
provide education through municipal schools. To measure the amount of education provided we
use 2 variables: number of schools and the monthly average of registered students at those schools.
3. Health: this is another of the most important services provided by municipalities. To capture
the amount of health services provided we use the number of health centres.
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4. Urbanism: another function of municipalities is to provide roads and places for recreation
such as parks, bike lanes, and so on. To measure the services provided in this area we include the
square meters of maintained green areas.
5. Hygiene: municipalities are in charge of basic services to promote wellbeing. In order to have
a measure of the amount of services provided in this item we use two variables: tons of collected
rubbish and houses with sewer.
6. Social Services: nally, we consider services provided to social organizations which have
municipal promotion and funding such as sport clubs, municipal services, elderly clubs, etc. To
measure the amount of these kinds of services we include the variable social organization which
registers all formal social organizations by municipality.
b) Input Variable:
After the denition of output variables we dene the resources used for the provision of public
goods and services such as those presented above. This is known as the input variable and is
denoted by C(yit; ) in equation (23). Previous literature use current (i.e. operational) expenditure
as input. The reason for this is because capital expenditure is highly volatile. We follow the same
approach in this work as in the Chilean case capital expenditure is also volatile. Additionally, current
expenditure represents more than 75% of total expenditure, hence we are covering the majority of
it. Given this, we have two alternatives: (a) use total current expenditure or (b) use current
expenditure of those services provided. The di¤erences between the two is that the former also
includes expenditures on items that are not easily or directly attributed to some particular output.
For this reason we choose to use as input the current expenditure of those services provided (i.e.
employees, consumption goods and services and transfers for education and health). We should
also keep in mind for the interpretation of results that we are measuring e¢ ciency on a subgroup of
all the possible goods and services a municipality can provide. In any case, we check the sensitivity
of our results with the alternative specication.The summary statistics for bothe specications of
input variables are also reported at the bottom of Table 8.
c) Determinants of municipal e¢ ciency:
To measure the e¤ect of demographic, economic and scal factors on ine¢ ciency, the model has
also incorporate some exogenous variables that may be considered relevant to municipal perfor-
mance. Determinants can represent a direct e¤ect on municipal e¢ ciency, discretionary inputs or
unobservable outputs. Discretionary inputs refer to production in a favorable environment while
unobservable outputs indicate service quality (as the included outputs variables in the model above
do not measure quality but quantity).
Determinants can have several e¤ects on ine¢ ciency, thus it is complex to identify the limits
of the e¤ect of each determinant. Previous literature on determinants of municipal ine¢ ciency use
similar variables for this purpose and for estimating ine¢ ciency. The variables we used to estimate
the determinants of ine¢ ciency are the following:
i. Fiscal capacity: a lower scal capacity of municipalities implies a tighter budget constraint
reducing the operational surplus, an e¤ect which may a¤ect municipal e¢ ciency (De Borger, Ker-
stens 1996; Balaguer-Coll el at 2007). To measure this e¤ect we use four variables: 1) dependency
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on the common municipal fund (FCM) relative to self-generated income (IPP) (Balaguer-Coll el at
2007), 2) percentage of investment relative to total expenditure (Athanassopoulos, Triantis 1998),
3) current transfers from public institutions, where the latter is in per capita terms. These variables
are included in order to measure budgetary tightness (Kalb 2010; De Borger et al 1994).
ii. Education: a higher proportion of educated people may imply higher e¢ ciency (De Borger
and Kerstens, 1996a). The reason for this is that municipalities can in this way count with a more
qualied labor force. This also should improve the accountability of the population relative to
municipal performance. As a proxy of educational level we use the average schooling level of the
population by municipality.
iii. Population (only for clusters): the hypothesis is that the larger the population the larger the
economics of scale and so such municipalities could reach higher levels of e¢ ciency on the provision
of goods and services (Prudhomme, 1995). This variable is used in the general model and not
for the cluster analysis as population was one of the variables used to construct the indexes that
dened the clusters. To measure this variable in the general model we include dummy variables
that account for quarters of population. In this way we include three dummies leaving the rst
quarter as the base category. The four categories are: 1) 1-9,027; 2) 9,028-17,963; 3) 17,964-51,838;
4) more than 51,838 inhabitants.
For the cluster analysis we include the variable distance to the regional capital. As Stastna and
Gregor (2011) pointed out, the hypothesis is that the closer the geographic distance between the
municipality and the regional centre the more intense will be the competition between them and
at the same time access to regional public services gets easier. Thus, we should observe that closer
municipalities relative to the regional centre would be more e¢ cient. To capture this we include a
variable that measures distance to the regional capital.
iv. Political factors: political characteristics of a municipality may a¤ect e¢ ciency in an impor-
tant way. The hypothesis is that a high level of political concentration is associated with a lower
e¢ ciency because of a lack of political competition (Besley et al, 2005). To measure this we use
two variables: 1) a Herndahl index to capture the monopolistic degree of the city council12 and 2)
the percentage of council representatives who belongs to the governmental coalition.
7 Results
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using the R-Project programme. This software
uses the parametrization of Battese and Corra (1977) which gives  = 
2
u
2 instead of  =
2u
2v
.
By replacing 2 = 2v + 
2
u we obtain  =
2u
2v+
2
u
, which has a value in the range (0-1). The
software allows us to test the signicance of the parameter  in order to evaluate the existence of
ine¢ ciency.13 Thus, if the null hypothesis  = 0 is not rejected, implies that 2u = 0 and then the
term u should be dropped from the model allowing the estimation by OLS.
12This index was constructed using the seats of each political party in the Council.
13The generalized statistic LR, , is dened as:  =  2ln(L(H0)
L(H1)
), where H0 and H1 are the null and the alternative
hypothesis respectively.If H0 is true then  asymptoticaly distributes as chi-squared. If H0 includes  = 0 (as in our
case), then  distributes as a combined chi-squared. The critical values for this test were obtained from Table 1 of
Kodde and Pam (1986).
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7.1 General Results
From the interpretation of the general model (i.e. without tipologies) it can be inferred that  takes
the value 0.346 being statistically signicant at 1%. This parameter can take a value in the range
0 to 1, indicating how much of the error term variance is due to the ine¢ ciency term ui. Thus, in
this case it can be noted that a great part of this variance is explained by white noise: vi. However,
an important part is also explained by the ine¢ ciency term. Furthermore, a LR test for the null
hypothesis was performed, testing that the elasticities of the variables of the ine¢ ciency model are
jointly equal to 0. The result of this statistical test was 72.47, which means that the null hypothesis
can be rejected and that the model does present ine¢ ciency.
The average e¢ ciency level for the 309 Chilean municipalities included in the analysis for period
2008-2010, is shown in gure 2. From the results obtained it is important to note that the e¢ ciency
level of the municipalities under study is, on average, 70.1% for the period. This implies that, on
average, municipalities bear a 30% in exceess of the required costs to operate over the e¢ ciency
cost frontier. Furthermore, 55% of the studied municipalities show an e¢ ciency level lower than
the 80%, and municipalities over this level account for 16% of the total. This latter group is the
more concentrated one, being in the range 90-95%, see gure 3.
From the result of the general model (i.e. without typologies) presented in column1 of Table 9
it can be seen that most of the determinants are signicant at 5% with the exception of the last
dummy of population, distance to the regional capital and the political variable percentage of the
council who belongs to the governmental coalition.
a) Fiscal capacity: results suggest that municipalities will have a lower scal capacity when the
dependency on the FCM relative to their self-generated revenues increases. This lower scal capacity
generates a tighter budget constraint, decreasing in this way current expenditure. Similarly, results
suggest that when the percentage of investment over total expenditure increases municipalities will
have a tighter budget constraint and therefore a lower current expenditure increasing in this way
the level of e¢ ciency. In the same line, higher current transfers from public institutions improve
municipal scal capacity and then increases their current expenditure, lowering their e¢ ciency.
b) Political factors: results do not support the hypothesis that a higher level of political concen-
tration, associated with a higher Herndahl index, making municipalities less ine¢ cient. On the
contrary, the coe¢ cient associated with the Herndahl index has a negative sign and is statistically
signicant. A plausible explanation to this relationship might be that higher political concentration
can make it easier to reach consensus (or agreements) among the members of the city council and
the major, making more expedite and ultimately more e¢ cient the decision-making process of mu-
nicipalities. On the other hand, the variable estimating the percentage of the city council belonging
to the government party does not have a signicant e¤ect on the e¢ ciency level of municipalities.
c) Education: results are unexpected since they suggest that the higher the schooling level the
higher the ine¢ ciency. There are two potential explanations for this: (1) municipalities with higher
levels of schooling have, in general, more resources, and therefore face a higher quality demand from
the community in the provision of good and services than those in lower income municipalities. (2)
municipalities with higher schooling levels have more resources and this relax the budget constraint
increasing ine¢ ciency.
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7.2 Results from the Clusters Analysis
Results by cluster of municipalities are presented in columns (2-6) of Table 9 and suggest that, in
general, the determinants have similar e¤ects in all of them.
From those that measure scal capacity, we nd that dependence on the FCM relative to self-
generated revenues, current per capita transfers from public institutions and percentage of invest-
ment on total expenditure, point to the same direction of the results found for the general model for
all typologies (with the exception of the third and fourth typology, in which we found no signicant
results at 5%, although they are at 10%, for current transfers and investment).
Regarding the e¤ects of education, we found that its impact is similar to the one estimated for
the general case for all typologies, however results are not statistically signicant for typologies 2
and 3.
In relation to political factors, we found that results for the Herndhal index are similar to those
found in the general model, in particular for typologies 2 and 3. For the case of typologies 1, 4 and
5 results are not signicantly di¤erent from zero (at 5%). An explanation for this could be that
these two typologies are smaller and poorer than the rest and therefore political concentration may
be less important versus familiar and/or cultural links between individuals in the area. In regard to
the results of the other political variable, we found that the percentage of seats of the governmental
coalition is only signicantly di¤erent from zero for typologies 2, 3 and 4 at 5%.
Finally, considering geographical determinants we found that distance to the regional capital
is signicant (at 5%) for typologies 1, 2 and 5. We found that a further distance to the regional
capital decreases ine¢ ciency for typology 2 but increases ine¢ ciency for typology 1 and 5.
7.3 Overall Results
Concerning overall results, Table 9 suggests that Chilean municipalities have a signicantly di¤erent
from zero degree of ine¢ ciency (i.e. the LR test H0 : 2u = 0; rejects the null). In particular, the
aggregate ine¢ ciency reaches about 30% but after disaggregating these results by cluster we found
that there is variance as ine¢ ciency levels reach 23%, 45%, 15%, 11% and 57% for typologies 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5 respectively. These results suggests that typology 5 has a higher level of ine¢ ciency for
the provided services. Furthermore, it should be noted that the high variance on ine¢ ciency levels
among municipalities within clusters which reaches between 15-19 percentage points. These results
can be seen in Figure 3.
It is crucial to remember that this study does not directly measure quality on the services
provided, which can play an important role in some services provided such as education. We tackle
somehow this issue in the next section.
When we analyze all typologies we found that municipalities in the top quantile of each cluster
present some common characteristics. In particular, Table 10 shows that, in general, the most
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e¢ cient municipalities (i.e. in the top quantiles) per cluster are those whose current expenditure in
services are lower than the average of the quantile, with typology 5 being the exception. The same
is observed for some of the output variables such as: students registered and houses with sewer,
while for rubbish collection, and maintained green areas.the evidence is less strong. By doing the
same exercise to the determinants (see Table 11) we found that most e¢ cient municipalities have
a higher dependency on the FCM relative to their self-generated revenues, a higher proportion of
investment relative to total expenditure, a lower schooling level and a higher political concentration
(as measured by the Herndhal index).The results for the rst two determinants may be explained
by the fact that these variables imply a tighter budget constraint and so municipalities use resources
more carefully given that they have to provide a minimum quantity of goods and services. Similarly,
results for education may be explained because municipalities with lower schooling levels have lower
resources and so they use money more e¢ ciently. The explanation for political concentration is the
same given above and it relates to the fact that more concentrated City Councils take less time to
reach agreements.
8 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the sensitivity of the results we modify some of the key assumptions of the model
and thus test the consistency of our ndings.
8.1 Multicollinearity
In the rst place we check the statistical correlations among the variables. This is important as
the Translog function used for our analysis may be susceptible to multicollinearity and degrees of
freedom problems. Hence, in order to check the level of multicollinearity of the output variables
included in the model, we analyze the correlation among them, results are presented in Table 12.
Results suggest that the variable showing a high correlation with all the other variables is
population. This is to be expected since the level of population of the municipality determines
somehow, the number of schools in a municipality, the same for social organizations, health centres
and so on. Therefore, despite this high level of correlation of this variable with respect to the others,
we decided to keep it given its importance in the determination of the level of services given by
each municipality
In addition, results also suggest that levels of correlation are low except for the number of social
organizations. We decided to keep this variable, since it allows us to measure the amount of services
provided by each municipality.
Furthermore, we repeat the same exercise with the determinants. Results are presented in Table
13 and suggest that correlations among them are not signi¢ cantly high.
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8.2 Alternative Costs Functions
All the analysis was carried out using a Translog cost function which gives exibility and relax
some of the assumptions of the more commonly used Cobb-Douglas production function. Even
though Greene (2005c) points out that results are overall similar irrespective of the function, we
now check how our results change when we vary the cost function. For this, we reestimate the
baseline general model but now using the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas instead of the Translog.
Results are presented in Table 14 and suggest that the overall results are indeed similar (rankings
of municipalities are similar as well) to the ones reported in section 7.
8.3 Alternative Denition of Inputs
As current expenditure on the services included in our model was used as input for our estimations,
we now check the sensitivity of our results to a slight modication of the input variable. We
reestimate the model but now using total current expenditure. Thus, we are considering all the
current resources used by municipalities on the provision of good and services. From Table 15 we
can infer that results are very similar to those obtained when the input variable is slightly modied.
8.4 Unobservable Heterogeneity
As previously pointed out, parametric methods can take into account unobserved heterogeneity
in explaining municipal performance. As a random e¤ect approach is used in this study, an as-
sumption that is implicitly imposed is that there is no correlation between the covariates and the
composed error term. Since in the error term unobserved heterogeneity is included, we consider
it as an implicit assumption of our model. In the municipal case, it could be questionable that
unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the covariates, hence we relax the assumption by
using Mundlaks (1978) approach. This approach consists of parameterizing the unobserved hetero-
geneity with the average (across time) of the time variables covariates. Results with the Mundlak
parametrization are shown in Table 16 and suggest that there are no signicant di¤erences relative
to the original model without Mundlaks parametrization.
8.5 Quality
As previously stated, we did not include quality measures in our determinants and thus the general
model focuses on the quantity of services provided. Despite this, we indirectly took quality into
account reestimating the general model but this time including a variable with the SIMCE average
score, for mathematics and spanish, (SIMCE stands for the Chilean national test taken to fourth
grade students). SIMCE was included in order to control in some way the quality of schooling
by municipalities. Results are presented in Table 17 and suggest that the e¤ect of quality is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. The reasons behind this result might be the following: a) the
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school listed at the bottom of its typology are indeed ine¢ cient, b) quality does not have signicant
e¤ects and there would be other variables that could explain this di¤erence or c) the measurement of
quality by the SIMCE variable is not a good representation of the quality of municipalities services.
9 Concluding Remarks
This work contributes to the literature by formally presenting a methodology to estimate munic-
ipal e¢ ciency with a one stage approach using a parametric model and panel data. Moreover,
unlike previous related literature it analizes overall e¢ ciency as well as e¢ ciency by clusters of
municipalities, in order to reduce heterogeneity, and thus diminishing the risk of omitted variables.
In particular, the application presented in this paper estimates a stochastic frontier model to
analyze municipal e¢ ciency and its determinants.using panel data from 2008-2010 of 309 Chilean
Municipalities. Results suggest that, in general, Chilean municipalities have on average an ine¢ -
ciency level of about 30%. We found that a higher population, a longer distance to the regional
capital, a higher dependency on the municipal common fund (a fund aimed at redistributing munic-
ipal income) relative to self-generated revenues, a higher proportion of investment relative to total
expenditure and a higher political concentration at the local level increases municipal e¢ ciency in
the provision of education, health, rubbish collection, contributions to social organizations, main-
tained green areas, and access to clean water.
Given high municipal heterogeneity, we reestimated the previous general model but at a lower
level. That is, we use more homogeneous groups (clusters) of municipalities. Results are, in
general, similar to those found for the general model. However, we observed that the di¤erence in
ine¢ ciency levels between clusters are quite signicant. Despite this, when we analyze the most
e¢ cient municipalities per cluster, we found similar patterns in the e¤ects of the determinants. We
found that municipalities with the best results in each cluster have a higher dependency on the
FCM relative self-generated revenues, higher investment as a percentage of total expenditure, a
lower schooling level and a higher political concentration.
Finally, we analyze if the di¤erences in e¢ ciency levels were due to unmeasured quality. We
include some quality determinants but their e¤ects were not signicantly di¤erent from zero. There-
fore, our results suggest that, in general and given the xed costs on the provision of the minimum
amount of public services established by law, municipalities with tighter budget constraints use
their resources more carefully and tend to be more e¢ cient on the provision of public services.
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Appendix
Methodology for Municipal Clustering
For the construction of the territorial index, primary variables are used where these primary
variables are conformed by secondary variables. To estimate primary variables, we transform the
secondary variables in "more urban" (1) to "less urban" (0) and then they were averaged to construct
every primary variable. In this way all secondary variables will be in the (0-1) range. It is impor-
tant to notice that 1 corresponds to most populated, less dispersion, more political-administrative
hierarchy and more territorial complexity from the urbanic point of view.
Let us consider any of the variables that conform each of the considered dimensions to be named
as variable X: There are two types of possible transformation:
i) The case where the variable is directly correlated with the 0-1 range previously described (e.g.
population), the procedure is the following:
Hi =
(Xi  Min fXig)
Max fXig  Min fXig 8 i = 1; :::::; 345
where:
Max(X) = maximum value of the variable X.
Min(X) = minimum value of the variable X.
X = value of variable X for municipality i.
ii) In the case when the variable is inversely correlated (e.g. rurality level) with the (0-1) range,
the procedure is the following:
Hi =
(Max fXig  Xi)
Max fXig  Min fXig 8 i = 1; :::::; 345
Once the variables are transformed, they are averaged in order to get one value by index (ter-
ritorial and socio-economic), then the next step is to construct the clusters.
In order to construct the clusters the K-medias methodology is used. This method uses an
heuristic algorithm, because it has a highly computational complexity which requires the number of
clusters to be used. The algorithm consist on the random election of K-centroides and it determines
the elements of the K-clusters based on the distance to the k previous points. Then, the centroids
of those clusters are determined and the process is repeated until some criteria of convergence is
achieved. This process give us the clusters to be used.
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Table No1
Summary of previous Literature on Municipal E¢ ciency
Author Year Country No Municipalities Methodology
De Borger 1994 Belgium 589 FDH
De Borger and Kerstens 1996 Belgium 589 FDH & DEA
De Borger and Kerstens 1997 Belgium 590 SFA
Anthanassopoulos and Triantis 1998 Greece 173 SFA & DEA
Sousa and Ramos 1999 Mina Gerais (Brazil) 701 FDH & DEA
Worthington 2000 Australia 166 DEA
Worthington 2001 Australia 167 SFA
Prieto and Zoo 2001 Castilla and Leon (Spain) 209 DEA
Ballaguer-coll et al. 2002 Valencia (Spain) 258 DEA
Afonso and Fernández 2005 Lisbon Region (Portugal) 51 DEA
Loikkanen and Susiluoto 2005 Finland 353 DEA
Arcelus 2007 Navarra (Spain) 263 SFA
Balaguer-Coll 2007 Valencia (Spain) 414 DEA & FDH
Afonso and Fernández 2008 Portugal 278 DEA
Geys and Moesen 2009 Belgium 300 SFA
Geys 2010 Germany 1,021 SFA
Kalb 2010 Germany 245 SFA
Bianchini 2010 Italy 100 SFA
Stastna and Gregor 2011 Czech Republic 202 SFA & DEA
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Table No2
Structure of FCM Municipal Contribution Contribution from the
wealthiest Municipalities*
Territorial Tax 60% 65%
Commercial Rights 0% 55% Santiago and 65% Providencia,
Las Condes and Vitacura
Transport Tax 62.5% 62.5%
Vehicles Transfers 50% 50%
Penalties and Fines 100% 100%
Central Government Transfers 218,000 UTM 218,000 UTM
*Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura
Table No3
Indicator Percentage
same proportion 25%
Poverty 10%
Exempted Land 30%
Permanent Self-generated Revenue (IPP) 35%
Total 100%
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Table No4
Socio-Territorial and Socio-Economic Indexes
Socio-Territorial
Dimension Description Variables
Size Quantitative dimension of the Population (Census updated to 2008),
population and housing Number of habitable
non-agricultural land
Dispersion Concentration of population on Rurality level (census 2002),
a given territory Populational density (2008) and
Entrophy*
Political-administrative Measures the political and Capital of the region situation and/or
hierarchy administrative relevance of the Capital of the Province situation.
municipality weighted by the
size of its region and/or province
Type of locality Takes into account a group of Score assigned given according to
relations and functions which occur the denition of the Housing and
inside the territory and allow Urbanism Ministry.
identication of rural-urban situations
Socio-Economic
Dimension Description Variables
Communal Assets Corresponds to the communal Average total value, percentage of
commercial activities and the the value a¤ected to taxes, per capita
communal land assets. average collection of commercial rights.
Human Capital Schooling level and educational Average schooling, weighted average
capacity at PSU**, % of literacy.
Socio-economic Material conditions of the % of poverty (CASEN), Average
characteristics of the communal population monetary income of the household.
population
*Entrophy refers to a variable which measures the order-disorder within a system. For our case means the
concentration or dispersion of the population in a given territory. To apply this concept, housing distribution by city
or town is used (Chilean National Institute of Statistics).
**PSU is the national entry test to apply for places at superior education (e.g. University).
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Table 5
Constructed Clusters
Clusters No Cluster Name Population % of Population
Municipalities
1 8 Big Metropolitan Municipalities, 1,010,515 6%
High development
2 39 Big Metropolitan/Urban 7,595,844 45%
Municipalities,medium develop.
3 37 Major Urban Municipalities, 3,543,432 21%
medium development
4 56 Medium Urban Municipalities, 1,777,524 11%
medium development
5 96 Semi-Urban and Rural 1,718,931 10%
Municipalities, medium develop.
6 109 Semi-Urban and Rural 1,117,127 7%
Municipalities,low develop.
TOTAL 345 16,763,373
Table 6
Used Clusters
Clusters No Cluster Name Population % of Population
Municipalities
1 45 Big Metropolitan Municipalities, 8,568,303 53.1%
High +medium development
2 34 Major Urban Municipalities, 3,353,886 20.8%
medium development
3 52 Medium Urban Municipalities, 1,682,469 10.4%
medium development
4 85 Semi-Urban and Rural 1,568,817 9.7%
Municipalities,medium develop.
5 93 Semi-Urban and Rural 974,023 6.0%
Municipalities,low develop.
TOTAL 309 16,147,498
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Table 7
Clusters characteristics
Cluster Average Density % Urban Population % Poverty Average Schooling
1 5,669 100% 18% 12.1
2 200 89% 16% 9.9
3 60 76% 21% 8.8
4 15 60% 11% 8.7
5 12 65% 20% 6.7
Table 8
Output variables summary statistics (average)
All C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5
Output Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Comunal Population 52,257 190,407 98,644 32,355 18,457 10,473
Scale
Education Average Monthly 4,520 12,048 9,108 4,017 2,290 1,519
Registered students
Mun. Schools 17 21 23 20 13 14
Health Mun. Health Centres 7 10 10 7 5 6
Urbanism Squared meters of 245,856 744,209 363,194 381,033 88,770 29,810
green areas
Houses w/ 10,864 42,459 19,832 6,388 3,319 1,696
sewer
Hygiene Rubbish 20,670 75,986 44,921 11,175 6,711 3,105
Collected (Tons)
Social Social Organizations 749 1,507 1,521 676 501 367
Services
Input
Expenditure Current Exp. (M$) 4,831 17,697 7,788 2,690 1,950 1,387
Current Exp. on 4,710 16,959 7,701 2,686 1,914 1,345
selected services
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Table 9
Results for the General model and the ve clusters
Determinants General C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.6453*** -0.4530 2.5357*** 1.0521 -1.9469* -0.5946
Municipal Population over
Regional Population -0.1811
Distance to Regional
Capital (ln Km) 0.0634* -0.1002*** 0.0976 0.0034 0.0721***
FCM
IPP -0.7237*** -1.0425*** -0.7275*** -1.3239*** -1.6731*** -0.4340***
Investment
Total Expenditure -0.6782*** -0.6017 -0.4329* -1.3878*** 0.6875* -0.2038
Public Transfers
Population 0.0027*** 0.0016 0.0040** -0.0070 0.0060 0.0324***
Average Schooling (ln) 1.2060*** 0.5363 -0.3638 0.5863 1.2443*** 0.5864***
Herndhal Index -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0001 0.0000
% Governmental Coalition
seats 0.0805 -0.5505** -0.2011 -1.9548*** 0.4359* -0.0687
2 0.0559*** 0.0156*** 0.0042*** 0.0289*** 0.0311*** 0.0297***
 0.3464** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.5216* 0.0104*** 0.9587***
LR test on 2u = 0 72.47*** 83.34*** 122.49*** 84.37*** 81.57*** 92.76***
Avg E¢ ciency 2008-2010 0.7018 0.7603 0.5486 0.8474 0.8830 0.4292
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Table 10
Municipal Characterization by its e¢ ciency level (Outputs and Input)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Current Expenditure Top Quantile 8,256,110 4,031,309 2,651,006 1,316,849 838,938
(Millions of $) Average Cluster 16,959,276 7,788,779 2,686,765 1,914,994 1,345,108
Population Top Quantile 130,485 57,130 33,546 9,631 3,939
Average Cluster 190,407 98,644 32,355 18,457 10,473
Built Areas (m2) Top Quantile 18,794 45,350 21,069 5,190 1,339
Average Cluster 128,551 105,697 241,693 816,319 188,236
Average Students Top Quantile 7,587 4,422 4,472 1,391 508
Registered Average Cluster 12,048 9,108 4,017 2,290 1,519
Average Schools (No) Top Quantile 16.9 11.5 25.1 12.9 7.2
Average Cluster 21.3 23.3 20.0 13.5 13.8
Average Health Top Quantile 10.6 5.7 8.7 4.1 2.7
Centres (No) Average Cluster 10.0 9.7 6.6 5.1 5.7
Green Areas (m2) Top Quantile 255,395 188,712 137,061 54,405 13,948
Average Cluster 744,209 363,194 381,033 88, 770 29,810
Rubbish (Tons) Top Quantile 50,898 53,070 12,407 3,412 1,295
Average Cluster 75,986 44,921 11,175 6,711 3,105
Average Houses Top Quantile 31.045 11.407 6.655 1.585 467
with sewer Average Cluster 42.459 19.832 6.388 3.319 1.696
Social Organizations Top Quantile 1.528 911 803 781 136
Average Cluster 1.507 1.521 676 501 367
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Tables 11
Municipal Characterization by its e¢ ciency level (Determinants)
C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5
Av. Distance to Top Quantile 3.71 52.57 101.65 139.41 108.16
Regional Capital (Km) Average Cluster 2.50 62.97 107.24 115.40 179.95
FCM
IPP Top Quantile 0.78 0.63 0.72 0.82 0.89
Average Cluster 0.37 0.43 0.66 0.60 0.80
Investment
Total Expenditure Top Quantile 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.19
Average Cluster 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.19
Current Transfers Top Quantile 64.60 31.95 32.01 12.29 5.95
from Public Inst. Average Cluster 93.33 64.00 27.96 16.87 12.78
Average Schooling Top Quantile 2.27 2.29 2.16 2.09 2.05
Average Cluster 2.37 2.30 2.19 2.17 2.06
Herndhal Index Top Quantile 2.027 10 9 8 2.253
Average Cluster 2.193 2.188 2.276 2.364 2.253
% of seats of Top Quantile 0.28 0.48 0.54 0.37 0.47
Gov. Coalition Average Cluster 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.40
37
Table 12
Multicollinearity of Output variables
Output Variables v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
Population (v1) 1
Monthly Registered Students (v2) 0.799 1
Number of Public Schools (v3) 0.448 0.692 1
Number of Health Centres (v4) 0.508 0.612 0.770 1
Maintained Green Areas (v5) 0.503 0.425 0.246 0.355 1
Rubbish Collected (v6) 0.923 0.754 0.400 0.492 0.449 1
Social Organizations (v7) 0.967 0.843 0.468 0.515 0.507 0.913 1
Houses with Sewer (v8) 0.582 0.583 0.498 0.501 0.292 0.571 0.599 1
Table 13
Multicollinearity of Ine¢ ciency Determinants
Determinants v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
Per capita Capital Expenditure (v1) 1
Distance to Regional Capital (v2) -0.0553 1
FCM
IPP (v3) -0.3024 0.2373 1
Investment
Total Expenditure (v4) -0.1447 0.0728 0.3532 1
Transfers from Public Institutions (v5) 0.6029 -0.1846 -0.4578 -0.3355 1
Average Schooling (v6) 0.3241 -0.0409 -0.7111 -0.4334 0.5489 1
Herndhal Index (v7) -0.0959 0.0566 -0.0407 0.0265 -0.1749 -0.0054 1
Governmental Coalition Seats (%) (v8) -0.0205 -0.0571 -0.1781 -0.185 0.0461 0.1331 0.3674 1
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Table 14
Alternative Costs Functions
Determinants Translog Cobb-Douglas
Ine¢ ciency Constant -1.6453*** -3.230***
Municipal Population over -0.1811. -0.397***
Regional Population
FCM
IPP -0.7237*** -0.655***
Investment
Total Expenditure -0.6782*** -0.850***
Public Transfers from Institutions
Population 0.0027*** 0.006***
Average Schooling (ln) 1.2060*** 1.892***
Herndhal Index -0.0001** 0.000*
% Governmental Coalition seats 0.0805 0.171*
2 0.0559*** 0.073***
 0.3464** 0.420***
LR test on 2u = 0 72.47*** -22.44***
Average E¢ ciency 0.7018 0.6756
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Table 15
Alternative Input variable
Determinants Current Total Current
Expenditure Expenditure
Ine¢ ciency Constant -1.6453 *** 2.167 ***
Municipal Population over -0.1811 -0.250 *
Regional Population
FCM
IPP 0.7237 *** -0.683 ***
Investment
Total Expenditure -0.6782 *** -0.674 ***
Public Transfers
Population 0.0027 *** 0.004 ***
Average Schooling (ln) 1.2060 *** 1.450 ***
Herndhal Index -0.0001 ** 0.000 *
% Governmental 0.0805 0.0805
Coalition seats
2 0.0559 *** 0.063 ***
 0.3464 ** 0.575 ***
LR test on 2u = 0 72.47 *** 58.38 ***
Average E¢ ciency 0.7018 0.6581
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
40
Table 16
Parametrization of Unobserved Heterogeneity (Mundlak)
Sigma-squared 0,0559*** 0,0560***
Determinants Random E¤ect Random E¤ect
+ Mundlak
Ine¢ ciency Constant -1.6453*** -0.4819
Municipal Population over -0.1811 -0.1675
Regional Population
FCM
IPP -0.7237*** -1.3855***
Investment
Total Expenditure -0.6782*** -0.6059**
Public Transfers
Population 0.0027*** -0.0015*
Average Schooling (ln) 1.2060*** 0.7549**
Herndhal Index -0.0001** -0.0001**
% Governmental 0.0805 0.1108
Coalition seats
2 0.0559*** 0.0560***
 0.3464** 0.3610**
LR test on 2u = 0 72.47*** 143.187***
Average E¢ ciency 0.7018 0.8476
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Table 17
Introducing Quality
Determinants General Model General Model
with PSU score
Ine¢ ciency Constant -1.6453*** -1.629***
Municipal Population over -0.1811 -0.180
Regional Population
FCM
IPP -0.7237*** -0.754***
Investment
Total Expenditure -0.6782*** -0.689***
Public Transfers
Population 0.0027*** 0.002**
Average Schooling (ln) 1.2060*** 1.198***
Herndhal Index -0.0001** 0.000*
% Governmental 0.0805 0.091
Coalition seats
2 0.0559*** 0.055***
 0.3464** 0.332**
LR test on 2u = 0 72.47*** 80.90***
Average E¢ ciency 0.7018 0.7092
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Figure 1
Allocative and Technical ine¢ ciency
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Figure 2
Municipal Clustering
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Figure 3
Municipalities by Cost E¢ ciency Level, Average 2008-2010
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Figure 4
Cumulative Frequency of Municipalities by E¢ ciency Level
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Figure 5
Histogram of Ine¢ ciency
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Cluster 5 General Case
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